decomposition-planner

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) during the task analysis phase.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided task descriptions are accepted via the task.content parameter in the decompose and _ai_decompose methods within SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The AI prompt used for decomposition (_ai_decompose) lacks delimiters (such as triple backticks or XML tags) or system instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the task description.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to invoke model-router and task-registry and performs write operations to PersistentStorage. Maliciously crafted task descriptions could potentially hijack the execution flow or poison the stored execution plans.
  • Sanitization: The implementation does not include any validation, escaping, or sanitization logic for the task.content before it is used in regex matching or AI prompt generation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 31, 2026, 06:59 AM