design-shotgun
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to use
mode: "bypassPermissions"to override safety and permission filters. It specifically references a 'Universal bypassPermissions' pattern (R010) intended to circumvent platform constraints. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions direct the agent to pass a specific bypass flag during sub-agent calls to avoid user confirmation (
acceptEdits). This represents an attempt to escalate capabilities beyond the default restricted environment and enable unattended execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the component description and interpolates it into prompts for multiple parallel agents without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The
<component/page description>argument defined in the frontmatterargument-hint. - Boundary markers: None. The input is passed directly to sub-agents in Phase 2.
- Capability inventory: Spawns multiple parallel agents (R009) to generate and display code.
- Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the user-provided description before it is processed by the generation agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata