grill-visually
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the user to execute shell commands using the
! curlsyntax to transmit base64-encoded answers from the local server back to the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted user input (notes, alternative answers, and custom decisions) via the local server and subsequently interpolates this content into agent-visible reports and summaries.
- Ingestion points: Data enters via the
POST /applyendpoint inscripts/server.mjs, which is processed byscripts/apply.mjsandscripts/lib.mjs. - Boundary markers: The skill uses labels like 'Settled', 'Deferred', and 'General note from the user' in its summaries but lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands within that data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to read/write files in the workspace (including
GLOSSARY.mdandADRs), spawn subprocesses, and trigger shell commands. - Sanitization: Input is tokenized and HTML-escaped for the web view, but the textual content is not sanitized for prompt injection before being presented back to the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The web interface provided by the skill (
assets/round-template.html) downloads external resources, including the Mermaid.js library and Google Fonts, from public CDNs. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!commandpattern to allow users to trigger server-side updates and feed the resulting state back into the conversation context via terminal execution.
Audit Metadata