kustomize

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The secretGenerator example in SKILL.md includes a hardcoded secret value (api-key=secret123). Hardcoding secrets in configuration files is an unsafe practice that can lead to credential leakage if adopted by users or agents.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides examples for fetching Kubernetes resources from remote, non-standardized sources such as github.com/org/manifests and raw.githubusercontent.com/org/repo. Fetches configuration from the well-known Prometheus Community Helm repository. Downloading remote manifests introduces a risk of deploying malicious or unvetted infrastructure if the remote source is compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes commands that pipe the output of kustomize build directly into kubectl apply. This pattern encourages the deployment of resources without a manual review step, which is particularly risky when combined with remote resource fetching.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via external data ingestion.
  • Ingestion points: Remote Git repositories and URLs specified in the resources and helmCharts fields of the kustomization files.
  • Boundary markers: None present. There are no instructions for the agent to validate the integrity or content of the remote files before processing them.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses kubectl apply, which grants the ability to create, modify, or delete any resource within the Kubernetes cluster, providing a high-impact capability if the ingested data contains malicious instructions.
  • Sanitization: None present. The content is used directly in manifest generation and deployment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 07:05 AM