cover-letter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from user-provided LaTeX manuscripts (e.g.,
main.tex) and cover letter drafts (e.g.,cover_letter.md). This creates a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded within the academic text to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent reads
main.texandcover_letter.mdusing the provided analysis scripts, includingscripts/tex_loader.pyandscripts/extract_manuscript_facts.py. - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdincludes explicit safety boundaries instructing the agent to treat all extracted text as untrusted evidence rather than instructions and to ignore any embedded requests to reveal prompts or perform unauthorized actions. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Read,Glob,Grep, andBash(uv *)tools. It is capable of executing its own local Python scripts but lacks network access or file-write capabilities (it explicitly avoids overwriting user files). - Sanitization: The Python scripts utilize regex-based extraction, whitespace normalization, and LaTeX-specific parsing to process data, reducing the risk of direct instruction execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
uvpackage manager viaBashto execute local Python scripts (e.g.,uv run python -B $SKILL_DIR/scripts/cover_letter.py). These executions are deterministic, pointing only to internal skill scripts, and do not involve remote code execution or the processing of unsanitized external shell commands.
Audit Metadata