trellis-plan-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read, analyze, and cite untrusted content from planning artifacts within a user's repository, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
task.json,prd.md,design.md,implement.md,implement.jsonl, andcheck.jsonlfrom the project repository (SKILL.md, Step 2). - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured report template and mandates citations (
finding-contract.md), but does not provide explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate or ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the reviewed artifacts. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read arbitrary files in the repository, write reports to the
.trellis/reviews/directory, and execute standardgitand internal Python scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, filtering, or sanitization of the content extracted from the artifacts before it is interpolated into the final review report.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes internal Python scripts and standard
gitcommands to perform its audit functions. - Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to executescripts/plan_precheck.pyandscripts/write_review_report.pyvia theBashtool. - Analysis: These scripts implement several security best practices, including validating task names against a restrictive regular expression (
TASK_NAME_RE) and performing checks to prevent directory traversal or file system escapes through symlinks and reparse points (plan_precheck.pyandwrite_review_report.py). Thesubprocess.runcalls within these scripts are list-based and scoped to thegitbinary.
Audit Metadata