ai-voice-cloning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts and character dialogue to generate speech via various AI models. While this is the intended purpose, it creates a surface where embedded instructions in the processed data could attempt to influence the AI models' output or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Text inputs provided to
belt app runcommands (e.g.,promptandtextfields) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the voice models.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute thebeltCLI for remote inference. - Sanitization: None described in the documentation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources from the inference.sh platform and its GitHub repository for CLI installation and documentation.
- Evidence: References to
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdandhttps://inference.shfor tooling and model playgrounds. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill demonstrates the use of the
beltCLI through theBashtool to interact with remote AI applications. - Evidence: Multiple examples using
belt app runwith various model IDs such asinfsh/kokoro-ttsandinworld/text-to-speech-2.
Audit Metadata