competitor-teardown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to analyze content from external URLs using tools like
agent-browserandtavily/extract, which exposes the agent to untrusted data. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through browser screenshots and text extraction from competitor websites (e.g.,
https://competitor.com/pricing). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the analysis prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
belt app runwhich includes a Python executor, browser automation, and search tools. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or filtering of the retrieved web content before it is processed by the model.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a hardcoded Python script to generate positioning maps using the
matplotliblibrary via theinfsh/python-executortool. - Evidence: A script in
SKILL.mddynamically creates a PNG image based on competitor data points provided within the prompt context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on executing shell commands via the
beltCLI tool to perform market research and product analysis. - Evidence: Multiple instances of
belt app runare documented for research, funding lookups, and UX reviews. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of external tools and provides links to remote documentation/scripts.
- Evidence: Documentation points to
npx skills add belt-sh/cliand an installation guide hosted onraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills.
Audit Metadata