javascript-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation files (
references/tool-builder.mdandreferences/agent-patterns.md) provide implementation examples that useeval()to process mathematical expressions in tool handlers and explicitly demonstrate how to enable thecodeExecutioninternal tool capability. While these are presented as SDK features, they introduce potential risks if implemented without strict input validation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill framework facilitates agent interaction with external data sources and tool outputs, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. The documentation does not demonstrate the use of boundary markers or sanitization for these data ingestion points.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
agent.sendMessageinputs and external tool results provided viaagent.submitToolResult(e.g., inreferences/agent-patterns.md). - Boundary markers: The provided code samples do not include specific delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill framework supports powerful capabilities including local filesystem access (demonstrated via
fsinreferences/agent-patterns.md), network operations (fetch,webhookTool), and arbitrary code execution (internalTools().codeExecution(true)). - Sanitization: The reference patterns do not demonstrate validation or filtering of external content before it is processed by the agent.
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