llm-models
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy for passing user-provided or external data to third-party LLMs, which is a common surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
--inputJSON payload inSKILL.md(e.g., thepromptandsystemfields) is the primary entry point for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON to encapsulate data, providing a logical boundary between the execution command and the data payload.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use the
Bashtool to execute thebeltCLI command. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the prompt content is documented within the skill; it relies on the safety filters of the destination models (Claude, Gemini, etc.) and the inference.sh platform.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the installation of external components from the inference.sh platform.
- It points to installation instructions hosted at
raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md. - It recommends adding the
belt-sh/cliandinference-sh/skillsskills to the agent environment.
Audit Metadata