newsletter-curation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest external data from search tools, which is a common attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External content is fetched using
tavily/search-assistantandexa/searchbased on user queries. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the templates to separate search results from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to using the
beltCLI tool viaallowed-tools: Bash(belt *). - Sanitization: Relies on the host agent's internal safety filters when processing the retrieved web content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
beltCLI to interface with remote applications for search, image generation, and social media posting. The execution environment is limited to thebeltbinary through frontmatter configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides instructions for installing the
belt-sh/cliand additional skills from theinference-shrepository. These are standard dependencies for the platform the skill is intended to operate on.
Audit Metadata