1claw
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install pinned versions of official vendor packages from the @1claw scope on npm, such as @1claw/mcp and @1claw/cli. These are standard dependencies for the 1Claw service functionality.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Includes a utility script
scripts/validate-setup.shthat uses curl and jq to verify API connectivity and credential validity against the 1Claw backend. The script enforces HTTPS and restricts requests to trusted hostnames by default. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits the agent's API key (ocv_ prefix) to the official 1Claw API (api.1claw.xyz) solely for the purpose of exchanging it for a short-lived authentication token, which is the intended security architecture of the service.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: While static analysis flagged the string 'ignore previous instructions', this occurs within a defensive context. The skill provides explicit guidelines and a dedicated
inspect_contenttool to help the agent identify and ignore malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
get_secrettool outputs, external API responses, and content passed to theinspect_contentscanner (SKILL.md, references/mcp-and-api.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly command the agent to treat instructions found in untrusted content as data and follow strict human-in-the-loop confirmation policies for sensitive actions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for blockchain transaction signing (
submit_transaction), secret modification (put_secret), and executing shell scripts for environment validation (SKILL.md, scripts/validate-setup.sh). - Sanitization: Employs a dedicated
inspect_contentMCP tool designed to detect injection, social engineering, and PII in arbitrary text strings before further processing.
Audit Metadata