cut
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external data that could contain malicious instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: Video transcripts read from
libraries/[library-name]/transcripts/*.json(as described inroughcut_agent_prompt.mdanddirect_path.md) and user-provided scripts that are either pasted into chat or read from local files (as described indirect_path.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide specific warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within transcripts or scripts.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via local
rubyscripts, copy files to the user's Desktop, and open system applications.\n - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the content of transcripts or scripts before they are processed by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for its core functionality, including library management, metadata extraction, and file export. Specifically, it executes local
rubyscripts, usesrg(ripgrep) for searching transcripts, and usesopen -ato launch external video editing software.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to copy exported XML files to the~/Desktop/directory. While this is a user-configurable convenience feature, it involves interacting with a sensitive user directory through shell commands (cp).
Audit Metadata