plugin-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
references/live-testing.mdfile describes an optional phase where the agent may runnpx -y <pkg> --helpornpm installon third-party packages. This involves downloading and executing code from external registries, which could trigger malicious install scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions involve executing shell commands using
gh(GitHub CLI) andcurl. These tools are used to fetch pull request data, compare diffs, and interact with external APIs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlto fetch configuration and reference documents from the vendor's official GitHub repository (raw.githubusercontent.com/base/skills/...). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from pull request bodies and plugin files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Pull request metadata and file content are read using
gh pr view,gh pr diff, and the GitHub API inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are provided when processing external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
curl,gh,npx), post comments to GitHub, and perform network operations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation applied to the external content before processing.
Audit Metadata