hey
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documents the use of the
hey auth tokencommand, which allows the agent to retrieve and potentially expose the HEY account's sensitive bearer token. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions direct the agent to request 'elevated sandbox permission' on macOS if an authentication error is encountered, which is an explicit attempt to bypass standard security and isolation constraints.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
hey watchcommand includes support for--run-syncand--run-asyncflags that execute local scripts (such as./triage.sh) in response to incoming email events, enabling automated command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from email boxes and threads and possesses sensitive capabilities to act on that data.
- Ingestion points: Email threads, messages, and journal entries via
hey box view,hey search,hey thread read, andhey journal read. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands in the processed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can send emails (
hey compose,hey reply), delete data (hey trash,hey delete), and access authentication tokens (hey auth token). - Sanitization: No specific prompt-level sanitization or escaping of untrusted content is implemented.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata