plugin-settings
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents a pattern where markdown content from project-local files (
.claude/*.local.md) is ingested and used as prompts for the AI agent.\n - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read content from
.claude/plugin-name.local.mdfiles within the project directory (as described inSKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: There are no clear boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested markdown body, which is intended to be used directly as a prompt for the assistant (e.g., in
references/parsing-techniques.mdandreferences/real-world-examples.md).\n - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell-based parsing (
sed,awk,jq) and demonstrates interaction with other terminal sessions viatmux.\n - Sanitization: While the documentation mentions using
jq --argfor safe JSON construction, it does not address the risk of the agent executing instructions contained within the ingested text.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided scripts and examples demonstrate unsafe shell command construction practices that could lead to command injection.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes a "Sanitize User Input" section that demonstrates writing to a file using a heredoc (<<EOF) with direct variable interpolation. This pattern is vulnerable to shell command execution if the input contains backticks or dollar-sign expressions (e.g.,$(...)).\n - Evidence:
references/parsing-techniques.mdcontains an example of updating settings usingsedwhere a shell variable ($NEW_VALUE) is interpolated directly into thesedcommand string without sanitizing the delimiter characters (e.g.,/). This allows forsedcommand injection if the variable content is influenced by untrusted input.\n - Evidence:
references/real-world-examples.mdshows a pattern usingtmux send-keysto transmit variables extracted from the settings file (AGENT_NAME,TASK_NUMBER,PR_NUMBER) to another terminal session. If these values are maliciously crafted and the target session is a shell, it results in arbitrary command execution.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the dynamic assembly of shell commands and JSON payloads based on content parsed from local configuration files at runtime.\n - Evidence: The parsing logic in
scripts/parse-frontmatter.shand the examples inreferences/parsing-techniques.mdrely on string manipulation to build commands that execute against user-editable files, creating a surface for injection attacks if input validation is bypassed.
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