memory-literary-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large external text files (literary works) into a structured memory system. If a source file contains malicious instructions formatted as narrative text or metadata, an agent might interpret them as instructions rather than data.
- Ingestion points: Instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to read source text using tools likebm catorsed. - Boundary markers: The workflow does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' prompts when reading the source text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has tools to create and modify notes (
write_note,edit_note), create projects (create_memory_project), and execute shell commands via thebmCLI. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input text content is performed before the agent processes it into the knowledge graph.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides complex Bash scripts for validation and coverage checks that interpolate user-provided placeholders directly into shell commands.
- Evidence: The 'Coverage Checks' section includes a Bash
whileloop that uses the<work>placeholder within a command-line string:bm find ... --project <work> --json. - Risk: If the project name or work identifier is sourced from untrusted input and not properly sanitized, it could lead to local command injection.
Audit Metadata