ticket-to-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from ticket bodies and comments, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: As described in SKILL.md, the agent reads the full ticket body, user comments, and the current conversation history.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between administrative instructions and untrusted data from the tickets.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted the capability to append content to tickets and update ticket metadata (removing the 'needs-details' state) based on synthesized information, as noted in SKILL.md.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the ingested external data before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata