outreach-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, specifically email and LinkedIn replies via
instantly__list_emailsandgrinfi__list_linkedin_messages. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where external content could influence the agent's summary or recommendations. - Ingestion points:
instantly__list_emails,grinfi__list_linkedin_messages(SKILL.md, outreach-review). - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly requires operator approval for decisions and reply sends ("decide gated", "Reply sends are gated").
- Capability inventory: Access to
paperclipaiCLI, MCP tools for Paperclip and CRM writes, and email/message sending tools. - Sanitization: Not explicitly described, relying on human-in-the-loop validation as the primary defense.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation within the skill instructs the agent to install and execute system-level tools and MCP servers to facilitate communication with the Paperclip control plane.
references/docs/paperclip-operator/cli-contract.mdincludes commands fornpm install -g paperclipaiandnpx -y @bbengamin/paperclip-mcp-server.- Configuration instructions for Claude Code include
claude mcp add paperclip -s project -- npx -y @bbengamin/paperclip-mcp-server. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and installs packages from the npm registry to establish its operating environment.
- The skill downloads
@bbengamin/paperclip-mcp-serverandpaperclipaifrom the npm registry. These are vendor-owned resources from the author.
Audit Metadata