sglang-explainer-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python and Shell scripts to invoke various command-line utilities. Scripts such as
make_cover.pyandedge_tts_engine.pycall FFmpeg for audio/video processing and headless Chrome for rendering still images from HTML templates. These operations are restricted to the project workspace. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
setup_env.shscript downloads Noto SC fonts from Google's official GitHub repository and clones the HyperFrames framework from HeyGen's repository. These downloads target well-known and trusted technology organizations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: At setup time, the skill creates a Python virtual environment and installs necessary libraries including
edge-tts,fonttools, andmlx-whisper. It also usesnpxto execute specific versions of the HyperFrames CLI tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub Pull Requests (including diffs, bodies, and comments) and external Markdown articles to generate narration scripts.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from public GitHub repositories using
fetch-pr.mjsand local file reads. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded commands within the ingested text.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment can execute shell commands (
ffmpeg,chrome), write to the local file system, and perform network requests. - Sanitization: External content is interpolated into internal scripts without visible sanitization, creating a surface for content to influence the agent's narration generation.
Audit Metadata