sglang-prod-incident-triage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The diagnostic scripts
scripts/incident_artifact_tool.pyandscripts/replay_trusted_request_dump.pyuse thepickle.load()function to process request and crash dump files provided via command-line arguments. Python'spicklemodule is inherently unsafe and allows for the execution of arbitrary code during deserialization. The scriptscripts/replay_trusted_request_dump.pyexplicitly states that it uses plain pickle to bypass security restrictions found in newer SGLang builds, which increases the risk of execution from untrusted dump files. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The insecure use of
pickle.load()provides a direct path for remote code execution. If the agent is instructed to summarize or replay a maliciously crafted dump file provided by an attacker, it will execute the embedded code on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from live SGLang server endpoints (such as
/metricsand/v1/loads) usingscripts/incident_artifact_tool.py. It lacks boundary markers or sanitization when summarizing this external data, which could allow malicious content within server responses to influence the agent's reasoning or actions. The skill's capabilities include local filesystem access, network requests, and the execution of the included Python scripts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata