notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/run.py,scripts/setup_environment.py, andscripts/__init__.pyto automate environment management. It handles the creation of a virtual environment, installation of requirements, and execution of internal scripts as sub-processes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs third-party Python packages (
patchright,python-dotenv) and browser binaries (Google Chrome) during its first-time setup phase. These operations are performed viapipand thepatchrightCLI to facilitate browser automation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted output from external documents via NotebookLM query responses, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious document could attempt to influence the agent's behavior through instructions embedded in the synthesized answers.
- Ingestion points: Query responses are scraped from the NotebookLM UI using the
.to-user-container .message-text-contentselector inscripts/ask_question.py. - Boundary markers: The skill appends a
FOLLOW_UP_REMINDERto the ingested text, instructing the agent to evaluate the response, but does not provide technical delimiters to isolate the untrusted content. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute scripts via the
run.pywrapper, manage local JSON files, and automate browser interactions with network access. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of the retrieved text content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages Google authentication by capturing and storing browser cookies and session state in
data/browser_state/state.json. While the skill instructions emphasize local storage and git exclusion, the handling of active session tokens for a Google account is a sensitive operation.
Audit Metadata