codex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to execute the
codexCLI tool with user-provided arguments. Notably, it suggests piping user prompts directly into a shell command (e.g.,echo "your prompt here" | codex exec resume --last). Without specific instructions for shell escaping or sanitization, this pattern creates a risk where malicious user input could include shell metacharacters to execute unauthorized commands on the host system. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation encourages the use of high-privilege flags like
--sandbox danger-full-accessand--skip-git-repo-check. Thedanger-full-accessmode explicitly grants the tool network and broad system access, which are significant privileges that bypass default safety sandboxes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow where untrusted data (user prompts) is fed into a powerful execution environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent collects user input for model parameters and task prompts to be used in the
codexcommand pipeline (described inskill.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters to protect the execution context from malicious instructions embedded within the user's data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to subprocess execution via
codex exec, with functional capabilities for file modification and network communication. - Sanitization: No technical sanitization or validation of the user-provided prompt is performed before it is passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata