The Agent Skills Directory

[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly promotes the use of the --sandbox danger-full-access flag, which grants the underlying CLI tool broad file system access and network permissions.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions to pipe user-controlled content directly into a shell command (e.g., echo "your prompt here" | codex exec ...) introduce a significant risk of shell command injection if the agent fails to rigorously escape the input string.
[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates appending 2>/dev/null to all codex commands by default. This suppresses the standard error stream, effectively concealing the model's 'thinking tokens,' reasoning process, and any critical security or system warnings from the user.
[DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By encouraging the use of --sandbox danger-full-access alongside --full-auto execution, the skill creates a high-risk environment where sensitive data could be accessed and transmitted externally without manual user intervention.
[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documentation includes deceptive metadata regarding 'GPT-5.2' and 'GPT-5.1' models. These claims are currently unverifiable/hallucinated and may mislead users into trusting the tool with higher-stakes tasks than its actual capabilities warrant.

codex