coupang-product-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to interact with the MCP server using
curlwithin a shell environment (as seen in the Workflow section of SKILL.md). This creates a vulnerability where malicious user input could be used to perform command injection if the agent interpolates search keywords directly into the shell string without proper escaping. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's core functionality depends on fetching data from an external, third-party endpoint:
https://yuju777-coupang-mcp.hf.space/mcp. This server is hosted on Hugging Face Spaces by an individual user and is not a verified platform-wide service. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User-supplied search keywords are sent to the external server
yuju777-coupang-mcp.hf.space. While functional for a search tool, this constitutes a data flow of user queries to a third-party infrastructure. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Data is received from the external MCP server at
https://yuju777-coupang-mcp.hf.space/mcp(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None are defined to separate untrusted search results from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
curl), perform network operations, and access the file system. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the content returned by the external API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata