to-epic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include a 'standing approval' clause that directs the agent to bypass standard transaction pauses and human-in-the-loop confirmations normally enforced by the
$backlogtool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data used to define project tasks.
- Ingestion points: Outcome definitions sourced from conversation history or external files (Step 1).
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat external outcome descriptions as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Backlog modification, local script execution, and sub-agent spawning.
- Sanitization: Absent; external data is directly used to generate task records and refinement documentation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script (
node scripts/validate-project.mjs) to verify the project's state upon completion. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the agent to record 'verification commands' within execution plans, which are designed to be run by downstream tools.
Audit Metadata