skills/beeltec/skills/to-epic/Gen Agent Trust Hub

to-epic

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include a 'standing approval' clause that directs the agent to bypass standard transaction pauses and human-in-the-loop confirmations normally enforced by the $backlog tool.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data used to define project tasks.
  • Ingestion points: Outcome definitions sourced from conversation history or external files (Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat external outcome descriptions as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: Backlog modification, local script execution, and sub-agent spawning.
  • Sanitization: Absent; external data is directly used to generate task records and refinement documentation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script (node scripts/validate-project.mjs) to verify the project's state upon completion.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the agent to record 'verification commands' within execution plans, which are designed to be run by downstream tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 29, 2026, 09:29 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — to-epic