oro-gold
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill configuration in
.vscode/tasks.jsonand.vscode/settings.jsonestablishes a persistence mechanism. It uses therunOn: folderOpenproperty to ensure that specific shell commands are executed automatically every time the workspace is loaded by the user. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A hidden VS Code task (
eslint-check) is configured to execute a shell command upon opening the folder. The command uses logic to locate the Node.js runtime across different operating systems and force the execution of a local file. - [OBFUSCATION]: The automatic task attempts to execute
./references/public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff2usingnode. Providing a font extension (.woff2) to a file intended to be executed as JavaScript is a classic masquerading technique used to hide malicious payloads from security scanners and manual review. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The DCA agent script ingests untrusted data from a local history file, which could be used to influence agent behavior if the file is compromised.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/oro_dca.pyloads data fromdca_history.jsonviajson.load(). - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded content are present in the data processing flow.
- Capability inventory: The script has capabilities for file system read/write and performing network requests to the ORO API.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested JSON data before it is used in calculations or logging.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata