docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and process injection in
scripts/office/soffice.py. It writes C source code to a temporary file, compiles it into a shared object library usinggcc, and then uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this shim into thesofficeprocess. This is used to redirect network socket calls to facilitate execution in sandboxed environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts, including
scripts/accept_changes.py,scripts/office/soffice.py, andscripts/office/validators/redlining.py, utilize thesubprocessmodule to execute system commands. These commands includesofficefor document conversion,gccfor the socket shim,gitfor generating word-level diffs, andpdftoppmfor extracting images from documents. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external
.docxfiles, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: Untrusted document files are ingested and extracted in
scripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/office/validate.py. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit markers or instructions to isolate the content of processed documents from the agent's execution context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute system commands via
subprocessand perform extensive file-system operations across several scripts. - Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis employed inscripts/office/validators/base.pyandscripts/office/helpers/merge_runs.pyto prevent XML-based vulnerabilities like XXE, the skill does not sanitize or filter document text for embedded instructions targeting the AI agent.
Audit Metadata