model-usage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Configures the installation of the
codexbarCLI utility from a third-party Homebrew tap (steipete/tap/codexbar). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes the
codexbarCLI tool usingsubprocess.check_output. Command arguments for the provider are constrained to a fixed set of options ('codex', 'claude'), effectively preventing command injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
model_usage.pyscript includes an--inputargument that allows for reading arbitrary local files. The script validates that the input is valid JSON before processing, but this provides a generic file reading capability to the agent. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses tools that access local session logs (e.g.,
~/.codex/sessions/) containing conversation history to extract usage metadata. While sensitive, this access is limited to the purpose of calculating local costs and no network exfiltration was detected. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external data from log files or user-provided input.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/model_usage.pyreads data from files via--inputor fromsys.stdin. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate ingested data from agent commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses and read filesystem data.
- Sanitization: Input is parsed as JSON, ensuring structural integrity, but the content is not sanitized to prevent malicious instructions embedded within the logs from influencing the agent.
Audit Metadata