peekaboo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
peekaboobinary via a third-party Homebrew tap (steipete/tap/peekaboo). This introduces a dependency on an external source that is not listed as a trusted vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides the agent with full macOS UI automation capabilities, including launching/quitting applications (
app), executing scripts (run), and performing hardware-level interactions like clicks, drags, and key presses. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Grants access to potentially sensitive screen content and user data through live capture, screenshots, and annotated UI maps (
capture,image,see). Theclipboardcommand also allows the agent to read the system clipboard, which often contains passwords or private data. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
configcommand explicitly supports managing 'credentials', which could lead to the exposure or manipulation of API keys and authentication tokens stored within the tool's configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Because it captures and analyzes screen content, an attacker could display malicious instructions on a website or in a document that the agent 'sees' and mistakenly follows.
- Ingestion points: Screen captures, UI element inspection (
see), and clipboard reading. - Boundary markers: None identified; raw UI content is passed to the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: Full OS-level interaction (click, type, open URLs, manage apps).
- Sanitization: No evidence of filtering or sanitizing captured text or UI labels before processing.
Audit Metadata