claude-code-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions encourage the use of CLI flags that disable interactive security prompts for file edits and shell commands.
- Evidence in
SKILL.md: Instructions recommend using--permission-mode bypassPermissionsfor coding tasks and document--dangerously-skip-permissionsas a way to "directly skip all permission checks." - These configurations allow the agent to perform potentially destructive actions, such as modifying source code or executing system commands, without explicit user confirmation during the automated session.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs the official Claude Code CLI from the developer's public package registry.
- Evidence in
SKILL.md:npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code. - This is a standard prerequisite for the skill's operation and targets a well-known service provider.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a delegation pattern that processes arbitrary task descriptions in a secondary agent session, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The task description passed to the
claude -pcommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags in its prompt recipes (e.g., in
references/task-prompt-recipes.md) to structure instructions, but does not include explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the processed data. - Capability inventory: The delegated session has access to the full suite of Claude Code tools, including file reading/writing and bash execution.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the task input is performed before it is passed to the sub-session.
Audit Metadata