claude-code-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions encourage the use of CLI flags that disable interactive security prompts for file edits and shell commands.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: Instructions recommend using --permission-mode bypassPermissions for coding tasks and document --dangerously-skip-permissions as a way to "directly skip all permission checks."
  • These configurations allow the agent to perform potentially destructive actions, such as modifying source code or executing system commands, without explicit user confirmation during the automated session.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs the official Claude Code CLI from the developer's public package registry.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code.
  • This is a standard prerequisite for the skill's operation and targets a well-known service provider.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a delegation pattern that processes arbitrary task descriptions in a secondary agent session, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The task description passed to the claude -p command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags in its prompt recipes (e.g., in references/task-prompt-recipes.md) to structure instructions, but does not include explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The delegated session has access to the full suite of Claude Code tools, including file reading/writing and bash execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the task input is performed before it is passed to the sub-session.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 1, 2026, 07:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-code-agent