claude-agent-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The implementation patterns create a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user messages while granting agents access to sensitive capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The
invokemethod insrc/ai/agent-executor.tsprocesses amessagesarray which typically contains external, untrusted content. - Boundary markers: No boundary delimiters or explicit 'ignore instructions' directives are implemented in the provided agent templates to isolate user data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The framework allows registering high-privilege MCP tools such as
playwrightfor browser automation and@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystemfor workspace access. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of the content passed into the agent's context.
- [SAFE]: The skill utilizes official packages from trusted organizations and well-known services.
- Fetches the Claude SDK and provider-specific libraries from Anthropic's official repositories.
- Recommends well-known and maintained MCP tools from the Playwright and Model Context Protocol organizations.
- Follows security best practices by using environment variables for credential management rather than hardcoding secrets.
Audit Metadata