gif-sticker-maker
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocess.runfunction to invoke system utilities includingffmpegandgifsiclefor media conversion and image optimization tasks. - Evidence: The skill implements
FfmpegGifConverter._run_ffmpeginreferences/step-4-ffmpeg-video-to-gif-pipeline.mdand_gifsicle_optimizeinreferences/step-7-batch-processing-and-optimization.md. - The implementation passes arguments as a list and does not enable
shell=True, which is a recommended practice to mitigate command injection risks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts by interpolating them into API requests for AI image generators such as DALL-E and Stable Diffusion, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Prompts are ingested via the
BatchItem.promptandGenerationRequest.promptdataclasses as shown inreferences/step-7-batch-processing-and-optimization.mdandreferences/step-2-ai-image-generation-integration.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or instruction-ignore markers when concatenating user input with internal style modifiers.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations via
httpx, file system writes for outputting GIFs, and shell execution viasubprocess.runfor media processing. - Sanitization: No specific filtering or sanitization logic is applied to the input prompt strings prior to their use in API calls.
Audit Metadata