critique

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied proposals and 'extra focus' text which are subsequently read by an external LLM. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User input captured via argument-hint and instructions to record the proposal verbatim are written to /tmp/critique-proposal.md as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses a ## Extra focus from the user header to separate content but lacks explicit system instructions for the Codex model to ignore or escape instructions contained within that section.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Write tool to create temporary files and Bash to execute the codex script.
  • Sanitization: The skill follows best practices by using file-based communication for the model to avoid shell-level command injection, but does not perform sanitization of the natural language content for LLM-level injection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/codex and uses jq to parse JSONL data. These are standard operations for an agent skill and do not involve untrusted remote code execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 02:48 AM