critique
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied proposals and 'extra focus' text which are subsequently read by an external LLM. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User input captured via
argument-hintand instructions to record the proposal verbatim are written to/tmp/critique-proposal.mdas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a
## Extra focus from the userheader to separate content but lacks explicit system instructions for the Codex model to ignore or escape instructions contained within that section. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Writetool to create temporary files andBashto execute thecodexscript. - Sanitization: The skill follows best practices by using file-based communication for the model to avoid shell-level command injection, but does not perform sanitization of the natural language content for LLM-level injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/codexand usesjqto parse JSONL data. These are standard operations for an agent skill and do not involve untrusted remote code execution.
Audit Metadata