verify-no-regressions

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes Claude Code's dynamic context injection feature (!) to execute shell commands when the skill is loaded. It insecurely incorporates the $ARGUMENTS variable, which contains user-provided input, into shell commands like git log and git diff via the set -- $ARGUMENTS` pattern. This allows a malicious user or a prompt-based attack to inject arbitrary shell commands (e.g., by using backticks, semicolons, or pipe characters) which will then be executed on the host system with the agent's privileges.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted data in the form of repository diffs and file contents, which are then processed by subagents (sonnet).
  • Ingestion points: Repository diffs (git diff) and file contents are read into the context via shell commands.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or specific instructions for the subagents to ignore commands or instructions embedded within the reviewed code changes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can spawn subagents to review code and run local test suites via package.json scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or structural validation of the diff content before it is analyzed by subagents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 10:22 AM