verify-no-regressions
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes Claude Code's dynamic context injection feature (!
) to execute shell commands when the skill is loaded. It insecurely incorporates the $ARGUMENTS variable, which contains user-provided input, into shell commands like git log and git diff via theset -- $ARGUMENTS` pattern. This allows a malicious user or a prompt-based attack to inject arbitrary shell commands (e.g., by using backticks, semicolons, or pipe characters) which will then be executed on the host system with the agent's privileges. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted data in the form of repository diffs and file contents, which are then processed by subagents (sonnet).
- Ingestion points: Repository diffs (git diff) and file contents are read into the context via shell commands.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or specific instructions for the subagents to ignore commands or instructions embedded within the reviewed code changes.
- Capability inventory: The skill can spawn subagents to review code and run local test suites via package.json scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or structural validation of the diff content before it is analyzed by subagents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata