store-teardown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple external sources including Taobao, Tmall, and Google Image search results.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
taobao_fetch.py(HTML/JSON scraping),google_images.py(search result parsing), andscripts/main.py(CSV search results) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when passing scraped content to the Gemini model in Phase 2.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the filesystem (
/tmp/store-teardown), network (requests,urllib), and can execute local scripts viauv run. - Sanitization: Absent. Scraped text (titles, descriptions, metadata) is directly interpolated into prompts for multi-modal analysis without escaping or filtering.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads images from various external domains such as
alicdn.comandcdninstagram.com. - Evidence:
scripts/download_images.pyandscripts/google_images.pyuseurllib.requestto fetch content from remote servers to the local filesystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runto execute local Python scripts which in turn perform network operations and filesystem writes. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiple shell blocks invokinguv run scripts/taobao_fetch.py,uv run scripts/download_images.py, etc.
Audit Metadata