gitea-tea

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to use sudo to move the downloaded tea binary to /usr/local/bin/ during the installation process in SKILL.md.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation steps in SKILL.md involve downloading a binary from dl.gitea.io and marking it as executable with chmod +x. This is a standard setup procedure from a well-known domain.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the Gitea CLI binary from the official distribution host dl.gitea.io as seen in the installation section of SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions to ingest content from local files into Gitea issues and pull requests, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Examples using $(cat feature-request.md) and $(cat pr-description.md)).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; untrusted file content is passed directly to command flags.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of tea binary commands for repo management, file reading with cat, and system installation with sudo (all in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; no instructions for validating or escaping external data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 04:53 PM