gitea-tea
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to use
sudoto move the downloadedteabinary to/usr/local/bin/during the installation process inSKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation steps in
SKILL.mdinvolve downloading a binary fromdl.gitea.ioand marking it as executable withchmod +x. This is a standard setup procedure from a well-known domain. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the Gitea CLI binary from the official distribution host
dl.gitea.ioas seen in the installation section ofSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions to ingest content from local files into Gitea issues and pull requests, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Examples using$(cat feature-request.md)and$(cat pr-description.md)). - Boundary markers: Absent; untrusted file content is passed directly to command flags.
- Capability inventory: Execution of
teabinary commands for repo management, file reading withcat, and system installation withsudo(all inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; no instructions for validating or escaping external data.
Audit Metadata