marketing-multi-platform-publisher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the
source_file(markdown articles). This content is dynamically adapted by specialized agents and subsequently passed to execution tools, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the agent's behavior. - Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: The
source_fileparameter inSKILL.mdallows the input of arbitrary article content. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are defined in the templates to separate untrusted content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
wechatsync,biliup,curl) and Python scripts to perform network operations and file modifications. - Sanitization: The skill mentions a 'Sensitive-word preflight' scan, which acts as a basic filter, but it does not prevent logic-based prompt injections.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates for executing various shell commands to manage platform authentication and content synchronization. This includes
wechatsyncfor multiple platforms,biliupfor video uploads, andcurlcommands to interact with a localxiaohongshu-mcpdaemon. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the agent to utilize third-party tools and repositories that are not managed by trusted organizations. Specifically, it references
xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcpfor Xiaohongshu publishing and theNemo2011/bilibili-apiPython library for Bilibili automation.
Audit Metadata