travel-planning
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the installation of the
xiaohongshu-clitool from an external third-party Homebrew tapxpzouying/agent-cli. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs cloning of source code for
ctrip-cliandbooking-clifrom a GitHub repository (https://github.com/better-world-ai/x-cli). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve compiling downloaded source code using
go buildand executing the resulting binaries on the local system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple shell commands are orchestrated to invoke CLI tools (
ctrip-cli,booking-cli,xiaohongshu-cli), passing parameters potentially influenced by external data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external travel platforms.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
xiaohongshu-cli search(user travel notes) andctrip-cli destination(travel tips/notes) is processed in the agent context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The environment allows shell execution of downloaded binaries.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external platform data before it is consumed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata