godot-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts, including
add_node.py,create_scene.py,gltf_processor.py,load_sprite.py, andui_assembler.py, generate temporary GDScript files (.gd) at runtime. These files are then executed using the Godot engine's headless mode via theGodotBase.run()method defined inscripts/base.py. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The generated scripts use Python f-strings to interpolate user-provided command-line arguments (such as
args.type,args.name,args.res, andargs.json) directly into the executable code without sanitization. This facilitates classic code injection. For example, inscripts/add_node.py, the variableargs.typeis used to instantiate a node:var n = {args.type}.new(). An attacker could provide a payload that breaks out of this statement to execute arbitrary GDScript logic, which has full access to the host operating system through Godot'sOS.execute()and file system APIs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project assets and external data (JSON layouts, scene resources). If an attacker provides a maliciously crafted Godot project or data file, the skill will ingest this content and incorporate it into the vulnerable code-generation process. This allows for unauthorized code execution when the agent performs automation tasks on a compromised project file.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata