autonomous-loops
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation explicitly recommends an installation command that pipes a remote script to the shell:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh | bash. This allows unverified remote code execution from a source outside of the trusted vendor list. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads implementation scripts from the
AnandChowdhary/continuous-claudeGitHub repository, which is an external source not associated with the primary vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides bash script templates that automate the execution of CLI tools like
claude,gh, andnpm. While functional, these patterns facilitate the automated execution of potentially compromised code paths. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The architecture described in the skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent processes external files such as
docs/auth-spec.md,specs/component-spec.md,SHARED_TASK_NOTES.md, and CI logs viagh run view. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are utilized to separate instructions from untrusted data in these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill loops possess extensive capabilities including file system modification (Read, Write, Edit) and shell command execution (Bash).
- Sanitization: The instructions provide no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested external content before it influences the agent's behavior.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata