bfs-ai-script
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local wrapper script located at
/Volumes/SSD2T/code/ai-script. It also directs the agent to use the system utilityffmpegfor audio format conversion anduvfor running the local project. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script is described as automatically sourcing the user's shell configuration file (
~/.zshrc) to load environment variables and API keys into the agent's execution environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface by ingesting untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The
scrapecommand (fetching web pages via Firecrawl),searchcommand (web results via Tavily), andscholarcommand (academic data via OpenAlex) all introduce external, potentially adversarial content into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted external content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, write files to the local disk (via the
-ooutput flag), and perform network operations through various AI providers. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from web scraping or searches before it is processed by the agent or passed to subsequent LLM sub-commands.
Audit Metadata