bfs-prompt-architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-provided content (referred to as a "rough brief") to synthesize technical specifications and implementation prompts. This architectural pattern is susceptible to indirect prompt injection, where a malicious brief could contain instructions intended to bypass safety filters or manipulate the agent's final output.
- Ingestion points: The user input brief is ingested via the
argument-hintparameter inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings to isolate user input from its own internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted via
disable-model-invocation: trueand lacks capabilities for file writing, network access, or subprocess execution. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the user-provided brief is performed prior to its transformation into a product spec.
Audit Metadata