gemini-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the Gemini CLI's ability to ingest untrusted external data (via URLs and local files) and process it with high-privilege tools, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
@reference syntax (e.g.,@https://example.com) and theweb_fetchbuilt-in tool allow the agent to pull external content into its prompt context. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded directives are included in the documentation examples for handling external data.
- Capability inventory: The tool provides capabilities including
run_shell_command,write_file,read_file, andreplaceacross various configuration files likesettings.jsonand.tomlcommands. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating external content before it is processed by the model or used in shell command prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation describes the
!{command}syntax used in custom.tomlslash commands and MCP server configurations, which allows for shell command execution. While a core feature of the Gemini CLI, this presents a risk if commands are dynamically generated or used with the--auto-approveflag without manual review. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of CLI extensions and MCP servers from external repositories (e.g., GitHub). These references target trusted organizations and well-known services, such as official Google Cloud Platform and Model Context Protocol repositories.
Audit Metadata