stitch-design-system

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow (Path B) that ingests and processes external DESIGN.md documents through an LLM to derive design tokens and configure system themes. This creates an attack surface where a malicious document could contain instructions designed to override agent behavior or manipulate the configuration of the Stitch project.
  • Ingestion points: The upload_design_md tool accepts designMdBase64 content derived from local markdown files, which is subsequently parsed by the Stitch service.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide the agent with specific delimiters or guidance to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested prose.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses mcp__stitch__* tools to create and update design systems, apply themes to screens, and read/write project metadata.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill explicitly states that "Stitch parses meaning, not a fixed key-value format," which increases the reliance on the model's interpretation of untrusted prose.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit shell and PowerShell commands for the agent to execute locally to prepare data for the MCP server. While these are standard utilities (e.g., base64), they demonstrate a pattern of shell interaction based on skill instructions.
  • Evidence: references/design-md.md contains commands for Linux/macOS (base64 -w 0 DESIGN.md) and Windows PowerShell ([Convert]::ToBase64String(...)) to encode files before transmission.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 09:59 AM