stitch-design-system
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow (Path B) that ingests and processes external
DESIGN.mddocuments through an LLM to derive design tokens and configure system themes. This creates an attack surface where a malicious document could contain instructions designed to override agent behavior or manipulate the configuration of the Stitch project. - Ingestion points: The
upload_design_mdtool acceptsdesignMdBase64content derived from local markdown files, which is subsequently parsed by the Stitch service. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide the agent with specific delimiters or guidance to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested prose.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
mcp__stitch__*tools to create and update design systems, apply themes to screens, and read/write project metadata. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill explicitly states that "Stitch parses meaning, not a fixed key-value format," which increases the reliance on the model's interpretation of untrusted prose.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit shell and PowerShell commands for the agent to execute locally to prepare data for the MCP server. While these are standard utilities (e.g.,
base64), they demonstrate a pattern of shell interaction based on skill instructions. - Evidence:
references/design-md.mdcontains commands for Linux/macOS (base64 -w 0 DESIGN.md) and Windows PowerShell ([Convert]::ToBase64String(...)) to encode files before transmission.
Audit Metadata