claude-code-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a
bashcommand allowing arbitrary shell execution on the host via the backend API. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns system processes to host MCP servers based on commands and arguments specified in the
mcp_config.jsonconfiguration file. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Example configurations and documentation promote the use of
npx -yto fetch and execute packages from the official npm registry, which is a well-known and trusted service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill supports
--skip-permissionsandbypassPermissionsmodes, which are documented features that suppress interactive security confirmations for the agent's actions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from files, shell outputs, and web fetches without sanitization, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection within the agent loop.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from
Bash,Read, andWebFetchtools, as well as messages from thesession-sendcommand, are integrated into the persistent agent context insrc/index.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not wrap tool outputs in protective delimiters or provide explicit instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within processed data.
- Capability inventory: The integrated tools provide high-privilege capabilities including arbitrary shell execution, file system modification, and network connectivity.
- Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on external data before it is presented to the agent loop.
Audit Metadata