content-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-provided content (brain dumps, notes, and research) to generate various content formats, which creates an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through placeholders in the prompt files:
{notes}inprompts/first-draft.md,{text}inprompts/clarity-pass.md,prompts/empathy-rewrite.md, andprompts/polish-pass.md, and{source_content}inprompts/remix-engine.md. - Boundary markers: The templates use markdown headers and block delimiters (e.g.,
[NOTES],[SOURCE]) to separate user input from the agent's instructions, reducing the risk of accidental instruction confusion. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes a platform-specific
sessions_spawncommand to create new agent sessions for specific tasks. It does not perform network operations or file system modifications. - Sanitization: The skill relies on formatting and delimitation but does not implement programmatic escaping or validation of the interpolated content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to utilize a platform-specific command to manage parallel content production tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions for the agent to usesessions_spawn --task "..."to delegate writing and remixing tasks to sub-agent sessions.
Audit Metadata