ke-office-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The functions
rename_files,merge_excel_files, andmerge_pdf_filesinoffice_automation.pyaccept file paths and naming patterns directly from command-line arguments without validation. This allows for path traversal attacks where a user-controlledoutputorpatternstring containing sequences like../or absolute paths could cause the script to move or overwrite files in arbitrary system locations usingshutil.moveand file write methods. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
SKILL.mddocumentation prominently features anemail-sendoperation, including command-line examples and configuration details for sending automated emails. However, the providedoffice_automation.pysource code contains no logic or library imports for network communication or email transmission. This discrepancy is deceptive regarding the skill's actual capabilities and its potential for network activity. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external office documents.
- Ingestion points: Files are read into memory via
pd.read_excel,PdfReader, anddocx.Documentwithinoffice_automation.py. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish between legitimate data and potential instructions embedded in the documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read, write, and move capabilities on the local file system.
- Sanitization: The script performs no validation or escaping of the content read from Excel, PDF, or Word files before incorporating it into report files or merged output documents.
Audit Metadata