ke-office-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The functions rename_files, merge_excel_files, and merge_pdf_files in office_automation.py accept file paths and naming patterns directly from command-line arguments without validation. This allows for path traversal attacks where a user-controlled output or pattern string containing sequences like ../ or absolute paths could cause the script to move or overwrite files in arbitrary system locations using shutil.move and file write methods.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The SKILL.md documentation prominently features an email-send operation, including command-line examples and configuration details for sending automated emails. However, the provided office_automation.py source code contains no logic or library imports for network communication or email transmission. This discrepancy is deceptive regarding the skill's actual capabilities and its potential for network activity.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external office documents.
  • Ingestion points: Files are read into memory via pd.read_excel, PdfReader, and docx.Document within office_automation.py.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish between legitimate data and potential instructions embedded in the documents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read, write, and move capabilities on the local file system.
  • Sanitization: The script performs no validation or escaping of the content read from Excel, PDF, or Word files before incorporating it into report files or merged output documents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 24, 2026, 12:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ke-office-automation