oracle

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes extensive use of npx -y @steipete/oracle, which downloads an external package from the NPM registry and executes it immediately without user confirmation of the package source.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By using the npx command with external packages, the skill performs remote code execution of third-party code on the local system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands to bundle files and interact with external processes (browsers or APIs).
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The core functionality of the skill involves reading local source files (e.g., src/**) and transmitting their content to external AI platforms such as OpenAI's ChatGPT or other model APIs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from the local file system and interpolates it into a prompt for a secondary AI model.
  • Ingestion points: Local files matched by the --file patterns in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the CLI arguments provided.
  • Capability inventory: The @steipete/oracle tool has capabilities for file system access, network communication, and browser automation.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the contents of the bundled files before they are sent to the target AI model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 15, 2026, 10:45 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — oracle