outbound-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdpreamble executes two Python scripts,telemetry/version_check.pyandtelemetry/telemetry_init.py, whenever the skill is initialized. These files are not provided in the skill package, making their specific behavior unverifiable. Although they are described as local telemetry logging tools, their absence from the source prevents a full safety audit of the startup routine. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/cold-outbound-sender.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute a CLI tool (defaulting togog gmail send) for email delivery. The specific CLI command used is configurable via script arguments, which could be misused if execution happens in a shell context with untrusted inputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and processes it through an LLM scoring panel.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/competitive-monitor.pyperforms web scraping of competitor pricing pages and blogs;scripts/lead-pipeline.pyfetches lead data from the Apollo API. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the content scraped from external competitor websites.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to the Instantly API, send emails via SMTP, and execute CLI commands via the sender script.
- Sanitization: The skill includes a significant positive security feature in
scripts/cold-outbound-sender.pynamedvalidate_outbound, which uses regular expressions to detect and block emails containing API keys (e.g.,sk-patterns), authorization headers, or local file paths. Additionally,scripts/competitive-monitor.pytruncates large scraped content to 500k characters.
Audit Metadata